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Structural Change and Economic Development in 
China and India  




The comparison of the periods of rapid economic growth in China since 1978 and India since 1992 
markedly show different patterns of development and structural change. However, both countries 
experienced some advantages of “relative economic backwardness” and some aspects of the “fordist 
model of growth”. China had an anticipated and deeper structural change, spurred mainly by economic 
reforms and the growth of the internal market in the 1980s, and, since the mid-1990s, by a very rapid 
penetration of its industrial products in the world market.  
However, a substantial part of China’s exports in medium and high tech sectors are due to joint-ventures 
with foreign multinationals. India had a more balanced structural change and a slower insertion in the 
world market, although some sectors, such as software, steel, automotive and pharmaceuticals are recently 
increasing their share in the world markets. Owing to the huge number of micro-enterprises and the great 
size of the informal sector, India benefited much less than China from the economies of scale and from 
the third wave of the “fordist model of growth”. Both countries, but in particular China, experienced 
negative externalities of this recent phase of rapid growth, such as higher inequalities, pollution and urban 
congestion. 
JEL-Classification: O11, O53, O57, P51. 
Keywords: economic development, structural change, fordist model of growth, China’s 
economy, India’s economy. 
1.  Introduction 
China since 1978 and India since 1992 have passed through a phase of very rapid 
economic growth accompanied by very important structural changes in the productive 
systems and severe and largely unresolved social problems. The objective of this paper 
is to evaluate and compare some aspects of the different growth patterns of the two 
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economies analyzing in particular the relations between structural change and economic 
development.  
In doing so, we will utilise three concepts: Gerschenkron’s “relative economic 
backwardness” (Gerschenkron, 1962; Fuà, 1980), “the fordist model of growth” (Valli, 
2002, 2005, 2009) and Syrquin’s distinction between the productivity effect and 
reallocation effect (Syrquin, 1986). The first concept is well known and stresses the fact 
that an emerging backward economy may benefit from some advantages, such as the 
adoption of modern technologies coming from more advanced countries and the 
possibility of transferring large masses of the labour force from low productivity sectors 
(agriculture and traditional tertiary activities) to sectors with higher productivity 
(industry and modern services).  
The second concept, which is not to be confused with the more general concept 
of “Fordism” of Gramsci or of the French regulation school,
3 is mainly associated to a 
phase of strong growth of some interlinked industrial and service sectors where scale 
economy and network economies are of crucial importance.  
The third concept is a useful device to decompose productivity growth and comes 
from a long and important tradition of studies on structural change and development 
carried on by authors such as Kuznets (1966), Chenery and Syrquin (Chenery et al., 
1979; Chenery, Robinson, Syrquin, 1986; Syrquin, 1986; IMF, 2006).  
2.  The Third Wave of the Fordist Model of Growth 
The US experienced the first wave of the fordist model of growth for some 
decades following 1908.
4 West Europe, Japan and the four Asian tigers passed through 
their second wave in the 1950s and the 1960s. Since the late sixties, the US, Western 
Europe and Japan experienced a crisis of the fordist model and have entered a post-
fordist phase. In contrast, China and India have entered the third wave of the fordist 
model of growth respectively in the 1980s and the 1990s, benefiting at the same time 
from some aspects of post-fordism and from several advantages of relative economic 
backwardness. 
In the US the crucial sectors of the fordist model of growth were the automobile 
industry with all its interlinked sectors (steel, oil, tyres, auto repair, construction of roads 
and motorways, etc.). When in 1908 the Ford motor corporation launched, as a mass 
production product, the new Model T, which was much less expensive than pre-existing 
cars, it greatly accelerated the demand and the diffusion of the automobiles in the US 
market, and stimulated a rapid expansion of the steel, tyre and oil industries, road 
building, etc. In the 1980s in China, in a very different economic and socio-political 
context, the crucial sectors of the fordist model of growth were instead the electrical 
domestic appliances and their interlinked sectors (steel, plastics, electricity, etc.). In the 
                                                 
3 While our concept of “fordist model of growth” mainly regards the core of economic transformations, 
the concept of Fordism of the French regulation school (Aglietta, Boyer and other authors) is much 
wider and regards also the relations of the economic aspects with socio-political and institutional 
changes, the organization of labour and of production in the firms and the social conditions of workers. 
Their approach, which is partly a derivation of Gramsci’s concept of Fordism, is fascinating, but it is 
probably overly ambitious, since it implies the existence of a fully integrated social science. 
4 For a more complete analysis of the three waves of the fordist model of growth and the case of China 
see Valli (2009).  
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1990s in China there was the addition of microelectronics, telecommunication and 
energy. Finally, since the 2000s, there also has been a rapid growth in the production of 
industrial vehicles, motorcycles and automobiles. In India, since 1992, machinery, 
household electric appliances, steel, pharmaceuticals, and, more recently, software 
services, telecommunication, motorcycles, automobiles and air communication have 
been the crucial dynamic sectors. 
3.  Structural Transformation 
Most empirical analyses about structural transformation have two severe 
shortcomings. They often only consider the changes between the three great productive 
branches: agriculture, industry, services. However, also the changes among the different 
sectors of industry and services have great importance. Also the chance given to young 
school leavers not to remain unemployed or underemployed in agriculture and to find a 
job in industry or in services, which in general pay higher wages than agriculture, or to 
find a job in modern industrial or service sectors, which in general pay higher wages 
than the traditional ones, is usually overlooked or underestimated. Moreover, most 
empirical studies do not adequately consider the five main “virtuous circles” embedded 
in the “fordist model of growth”. 
The first virtuous circle can have a huge importance and consists in the fact that 
the rapid growth of production may generate economies of scale or network economies, 
higher productivity, higher profits, higher investment, further increase in productivity 
and production (see Figure 1). This feedback is associated with the rapid growth of 
industrial sectors where economies of scale are important, such as TV sets, refrigerators, 
washing machines, automobiles, steel, chemicals, PCs, mobile phones, etc. This effect is 
particularly strong in the period in which the internal demand for these goods rises very 
fast because several families buy their first TV set, or refrigerator, or their first PC, or 
mobile phone, etc. The effect becomes much weaker when economies of scale are fully 
exploited or when the sectors become mature, with substitution demand predominant. 
The second important “virtuous circle” operates though aggregate demand. The 
rapid increase in productivity leads to a rapid increase in unit wages without reducing 
profit margins. This trend, if accompanied by a rise in employment, determines a fast 
increase in total wages and thus in consumption, which can favour, together with the 
increase in total profits, a substantial increase in investment. The rise in consumption 
and investment leads to a rapid increase in internal demand.   
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Figure 1. The fordist model of growth in China 
 
Source: the chart is derived from Valli (2002). 
 
After some years, the improvement in productivity also leads to an increase in 
external competitiveness and exports and in the attractiveness of foreign direct 
investment. Internal demand-led growth can thus gradually become an export-led 
growth, as it has already happened in China, but not yet fully in India. 
The third “virtuous circle” operates through total profits and investment. The 
rapid increase in labour productivity permits a substantial rise in total sales and then in 
total profits, provided that profit margins remain relatively stable. This leads to a rapid 
rise in both intensive and extensive investment. The former improves labour 
productivity, while the latter leads to an increase in employment and thus to a rise in 
total wages, consumption and aggregate demand, communication facilities, etc. 
The fourth “virtuous circle” regards relative prices and the demand for selected 
goods and services. The very rapid increase in productivity in industrial sectors with 
economies of scale or network-economy service sectors can contribute to reduce the 
prices of their goods or services relative to the average level of prices. The fall in relative 
prices of these goods or services may boost their demand. The rapid increase in demand 
favours a rapid rise in profits and investment, contributing to the overall growth of the 
economy. 
The fifth virtuous circle relies on the increase of taxation which accrues to the 
state and local authorities due to the rapid rise in production and in sales. It facilitates 
the financing of schools, research and development investment, transport and 
communication facilities, etc. 
Naturally, the positive effects of these virtuous circles are accompanied by 
negative effects such as the greater division and fragmentation of labour and the 
increase in labour intensity and alienation in big factories. There is, moreover, a rapid 
increase in urban congestion and pollution, due to the rapid rise of the circulation of 
automobiles and other vehicles. Finally, there is a strong increase in energy consumption 
associated to the rapid economic growth and the greater diffusion of vehicles, PCs and 
domestic electrical appliances.  
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Unfortunately, there is no comprehensive theory which can account for the 
virtuous circles,
5 but the scheme depicted in Figure 1 may provide a general framework 
for the interpretation of some important aspects of the “fordist model of growth” as it 
operates in the two great emerging Asian economies. 
4.  Growth and Structural Change in China and India since 1978 
In 1978 China and India were two developing countries, with a very low level of 
per capita GDP and very different political, social and economic institutions. Both 
countries could be considered “latecomer countries” in Gerschenkron’s words, but, 
with a very low industrialization pace, they had not been able to exploit the advantages 
of relative economic backwardness in any meaningful way. The degree of poverty of a 
very large part of their population and the development model chosen by their 
governments had also prevented the two countries from starting any form of “fordist 
model of growth”. 
 




























Source: GGDC (2009). 
 
After the 1978 economic reforms China has experienced very rapid economic 
growth, and thus its economy could begin to exploit both the advantages of relative 
economic backwardness and some aspects of the “fordist model of growth”. In terms 
of GGDC estimates of total per capita GDP in purchasing power parities, China had a 
partial, but impressive catching up towards the US, rising from 4.1% of the US per 
                                                 
5 Pasinetti (1981) with his multisectoral growth model probably gives the most comprehensive theoretical 
approach which can explain both the changes in relative prices and part of the effects of technical 
progress on productivity growth and sectoral demand, while the neo-classical Solowian growth models 
and most endogenous growth models, being aggregate, do not explain the changes in relative prices. 
Neo-Kaldorian approaches stress the importance of economies of scale and the relation between 
product and productivity growth (Verdoorn’s law), but overlook the important effects associated to the 
long-run changes in relative prices.  
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capita GDP in 1978 to 19.1% in 2008,
6 while India passed from 5.3% in 1978 to 9.6% in 
2008, accelerating its economic growth mainly since 1992 (see Figure 2).  
In 1978 per capita GDP in PPPs was higher in India than in China, but China’s 
overtook the Indian level in 1984 and the gap between the two countries widened in the 
succeeding years. As we will see in the next paragraph, the intensity of growth and 
structural change was larger in China than in India and the phase of rapid growth was 
anticipated in China by about fifteen years. India could thus in a more limited and 
delayed way than China exploit the advantages of “relative economic backwardness” 
and some of the features of the fordist model of growth. In India most enterprises are 
very small and the informal economy is huge and growing over time, so that the 
advantages of economies of scale have been much lower than in China. 
In China the first wave of reforms mainly regarded agriculture, while in the 1980s 
and 1990s the second wave of reforms mainly involved industry, the services, property 
rights and institutions, and the third wave of reforms in the late 1990s and in the 2000s 
mainly regarded banking, finance and above all the rapid enlarging of international 
economic relations.  
In 1978 China was a predominantly agrarian economy, with 70.5% of the labour 
force and 28.2% of GDP in agriculture, forestry and fishing. In 2007 the situation had 
completely changed as China experienced a rapid and widespread industrialisation and 
tertiarisation process. In 2007 the primary sector shares in employment and value added 
went down respectively to 40.8% and 11.3%, while the secondary sector (industry and 
construction) increased to 26.8% and 48.6% and the tertiary sector went up to 32.4% 
and 40.1% (see Table 1). However, in 1978 in China the share of the tertiary sector, 
both in terms of employment and of value added, was very low if compared with market 
economies at the same level of development, due to the priority that planned socialist 
countries used to give to “productive” sectors, such as agriculture and industry, over 
“unproductive sectors”, such as a large part of the tertiary sector. This attitude changed 
in the last decades as long as the space of the market economy and of private ownership 
was gradually allowed to increase.  
 
Table 1. Employment and value added by sector in China (% of total) 
A) Percentages of total employment in China 
Sectors   1978  1989  1997  2005  2007 
Agriculture, forestry, animal 
husbandry, fishing 
  70.5  60.1 49.9 44.8 40.8 
Industry, mining, quarrying, 
construction 
 17.3  21.6  23.7  23.8  26.8 
Services    12.2  18.3 26.4 31.4 32.4 
Total economy   100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Sources: NBS (2007), pp. 27, 34 for 1978- 2005 and NBS (2008), p. 109 for 2007. 
                                                 
6 See GGDC (2009). The recently revised estimates of the World Bank for China and India are 
significantly lower, but the methodological bases of such large revisions in comparison with the 
previous World Bank data and alternative estimates are controversial. On this debate, see World Bank 
(2009) and Maddison, Wu (2008).   
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B) GDP in the main branches of the Chinese economy: 1978- 2007 (% of total GDP at current prices) 
Sectors  1978 1989 1997 2005 2007 
Agriculture, forestry, animal 
husbandry, fishing 
28.2 25.1 18.3 12.2 11.3 
Industry, mining, quarrying, 
construction 
47.9.  42.8  47.5  47.7  48.6 
Services  23.9 32.1 34.2 40.1 40.1 
Total economy  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Source: NBS (2008), p.38. 
 
However, China’s structural transformation and China’s fordist wave passed 
through two different phases. Between 1978 and the mid 1990s the rapid growth was 
mainly based on rapid accumulation and on the growth of the internal market, while 
since the late 1990s and especially after the entrance in WTO, from 2001 up to the 
2008-2009 global crisis, they were violently spurred by the rapid rise of exports and the 
great inflow of foreign direct investment. In the last six years the acceleration of exports 
brought about a recovery of the employment share of industry and a slowing down in 
the rise of the share of the tertiary sector. This was partly due to the rate of growth of 
some traditional industrial sectors such as textiles, cloth and leather articles, which could 
find a growing and easier access into the world markets; and partly to an entrance in 
new sectors such as ICT and later in automobiles, facilitated by several large joint-
ventures with foreign enterprises. A substantial part of the increase of exports in middle 
and high technical products was made by joint-ventures and foreign companies 
operating in China (OECD, 2005). However, in the last four to five years there were 
also growing outward FDI with a number of acquisitions of foreign firms and foreign 
natural resources by Chinese corporations.  
Since 1978 in India the industrialisation process was less rapid and widespread 
than in China, but the services sector, which in 1978 was already relatively larger than in 
China, increased relatively faster than in China in terms of value added, but not as 
regards employment, as we will see in the next paragraphs. 
It must be stressed that in both countries the labour productivity of industry 
(including construction) and of services was much higher than the labour productivity 
of agriculture.
7 Therefore the transfer of many employees from agriculture to industry 
and services has contributed to the pace of economic growth.
8 The possibility of young 
school leavers to enter industry or services rather than remaining unemployed or 
underemployed in agriculture, thus gaining much higher incomes or wages, was even 
more important. 
However, in India most people moving from rural to urban areas could only find 
jobs in industry or service activities of the “informal sector”, earning much less than 
people working in the formal sector of the economy.  
The Chinese government instead tried to hinder the possibility of moving from 
rural villages to urban centres by means of legal and administrative restrictions. 
                                                 
7 See paragraphs 5-6 and, for China, Maddison (2007), p. 70. 
8 According to Maddison (2007, p. 70) in the 1978-2003 period the impact of redistribution of employed 
labour force among the three great branches could be estimated to 2.01% points of average annual rate 
of growth of real GDP, equal to 25.6% of the overall rate of growth (+7.85%). See also IMF (2006), 
Herd and Dougherty (2007) and Bossworth, Collins (2008), for other estimates.  
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However, many workers left the rural areas creating a great reserve of precarious jobs in 
the cities, although the government tried to improve the conditions of life in rural areas 
encouraging the expansion of industrial and services activities through locally controlled 
public firms (TVEs), private firms and joint ventures with foreign multinationals, all 
strongly contributing to industrialisation and to rapid economic growth.  
After the post-1978 reforms in China, the initial source of capital formation for 
the rapid growth of TVEs was mainly due to the fast rise of productivity and surplus in 
agriculture, followed then by substantial investment in industry and services, spurred by 
the fact the government’s policy of maintaining very favourable prices for industrial and 
tertiary products compared with agriculture goods. The richest rural zones thus had 
growing profits, which partly served to finance the use of fertilizers and machines in 
agriculture, and thus to increase agricultural productivity, and partly were devoted to the 
creation or expansion of TVEs, private firms and joint ventures with foreign firms both 
in industry and in the services. Moreover the rise in agricultural and industrial activities 
led to a further growth of the demand for modern and traditional services, for 
residential and non-residential construction and for infrastructure (roads, bridges, 
electricity, railways, telecommunication, ports, airports, etc.). On the opposite end, the 
poorest agricultural zones experienced a very low growth in industry, services and public 
infrastructure, so that regional inequalities tended to rapidly widen. 
The expansion of TVEs, private firms and joint ventures with foreign 
multinationals, made up for the decline of large state firms and led to a rapid increase in 
employment in industry and services, which contributed to almost 80% of the increase 
in total employment in the 1978-1995 period and to a substantial share of the increase in 
the 1995-2008 period. 
However, in the last three decades, in addition to the great transformation 
between the three main branches – agriculture, industry and services – there was also a 
dramatic structural transformation within industry and within the tertiary activities. Table 
2 gives an idea of the very rapid growth in the volume of physical output in some 
modern industrial and service sectors and of the consistent, but on average lower, rate 
of growth of traditional sectors, such as the production of yarn, cloth and refined sugar. 
In 1980 the main industrial sectors were the traditional ones: textiles, clothes, food 
and beverage, bicycles, etc., with a limited presence of some scale intensive sectors such 
as steel, chemicals and fertilizers. Electricity and telecommunication services were 
uncommon and unreliable and residential constructions were curtailed, with very small 
and crowded apartments in the cities. 
In 1995 and much more by 2007 the situation had radically changed (Maddison, 
2007). While in 1978 textiles in China had been by far the most important sector in 
terms of the percentage of total value added, since the mid-1990s the electrical and non-
electrical machines and chemicals surpassed textiles. Also the growth in production 
quantities of the goods produced by modern industrial products such as PCs and mobile 
phones was much faster than for textiles and most other traditional sectors. 
Residential and non–residential construction was booming, especially in big urban 
centres. Richer provinces built a relatively good network of public and private 
infrastructures, but pollution, congestion and energy dependence from abroad were also 
rapidly rising.  
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Since 1992 China has become a net importer of oil and other energy sources and 
its imports have grown rapidly over time. Moreover, China continues to heavily rely on 
its abundant coal reserves, thus increasing air pollution. 
 
Table 2. Growth of some industrial and service sectors in China: 1980-2007  
a) Physical quantities (output) 
Sectors   1980   1990   2004   2007  
Refrigerators,  millions  0.05 4.60 30.30  43.97 
TV sets, millions  2.50  26.80  73.30  84.33 
Crude steel, mlns. tons  37.00  66.00  272.00  489.66 
Chemical fibres, million tons.  0.45  1.65  14.20  23.90 
PCs,  millions  - - 45.1  120.73 
Mobile phones, millions  -  -  233.0  548.58 
Motor vehicles, millions  0.22  0.50  5.10  8.88 
of which automobiles  0.10  0.30  2.3  4.80 
Electricity, billion Kwh  300.60  621.20  2187.0  3277.72 
Telephones, millions  2.14  6.84  312.6  - 
Refined sugar, million tons  2.57 5.82 10.34  12.71 
Yarn, million tons  2.93  4.63  12.91  20.68 
Cloth, 100 million m  134.70 188.80 482.10 675.26 
 
B) Indexes (1980=100) 
Sectors   1980   1990   2004   2007 
Refrigerators, millions  100.0   920.0   6060.0   8794.0 
TV sets, millions  100.0  1072.0   2932.0   3373.2 
Steel, million tons  100.0  178.4   735.1   1323,4 
Chemical fibres million tns.  100.0   366.7   3155.6   5311.1 
Motor vehicles, millions  100.0   227.3   2318.2   4036.4 
of which automobiles  100.0   300.0   2300.0   4800.0 
Electricity, billion Kw.  100.0   206.7   727.5  1090.4 
Telephones, millions  100.0   319.6  14609.3  - 
Refined sugar, million tons  100.0 226.5 402.2 494.7 
Yarn, million tons  100.0  158.1  441.3  706.8 
Cloth, 100 million m  100.0 140.2 357.9 501.3 
See Valli (2009), p.16. Sources: China National Bureau of Statistics, China Statistical Yearbooks (various years). 
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The rapid growth in household electrical appliances, telecommunication, and then 
PC, steel, means of transportation and finance led to the rise and consolidation of a 
middle and upper middle class, concentrated mainly in the great urban coastal zones. 
Thus social and economic inequalities strongly increased. In particular there was a 
marked increase in overall inequality indexes, such as the Gini index, which surpassed 
the levels of the US and of most industrialized countries, and a strong rise in regional 
inequalities among provinces.
9  
India had a marked acceleration of economic growth after the debt crisis of 1991 
and the ensuing economic reforms of Prime Minister Narasimha Rao of the Indian 
Congress Party.
10 According to several authors, the essential reforms that led to the 
period of rapid growth were gradually introduced starting in the mid-1980s, while after 
1992 there was a sharp rise in the rate of economic growth. In the 1992-2008 period, the 
rate of growth of real GDP and real GDP in PPA markedly increased surpassing 
respectively 7% and 5%. 
The phase of rapid growth in the Indian economy led, with less intensity and a 
delay of 14-15 years if compared with China, to a gradual decrease of the agricultural 
share in employment and value-added, and an increase in the share of industry and 
services (see Table 3). 
 
Table 3. Employment and value added by sector in India (% of total) 
EMPLOYMENT   1978   1993   2004 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing   71   64   57 
Industry    13   15   18 
Services   16   21   25 
Total   100   100   100 
VALUE ADDED        
Agriculture, forestry and fishing   44   33   22 
Industry and construction   24   28   28 
Services   32   39   50 
Total   100   100   100 
See Bossworth, Collins (2008), p. 49. Sources: India National Accounts, Indian National Sample Survey Organization. 
 
                                                 
9 See, for example, Galbraith, Kritynskaia, Wang (2004), Saccone (2008).  
10 According to F.R. Frankel (2005), p. 591, “the government drastically cut back the number of industries 
reserved for the public sector, removed compulsory licensing on the private sector for starting [a 
business] and expanding new enterprises in virtually all industries; devalued the rupee; introduced 
current account convertibility to pay balances on the current export and import (trade) account; 
removed quantitative quotas on imports; steadily reduced tariff levels on import; lifted restrictions on 
majority foreign investment in a wide range of industries; allowed foreign companies to borrow funds in 
India, raise public deposits and expand their operations by creating new businesses, and permitted 
foreign financial institutions to make direct portfolio investment in India’s two stock markets”.   
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In India the 1992-2008 period of rapid growth was accompanied by some aspects 
of the “fordist model of growth”, although much less importantly than in China. 
While in China this model of growth began in the 1980s and was essentially based 
upon a large and gradually increasing number of industrial sectors, in India it was 
delayed by over a decade. Moreover, it was less based on industry, but more on services, 
such as banking, transport and telecommunication and above all on the production and 
export of a variety of software services. However, if we take into consideration the fact 
that India reached the Chinese 1995 per capita level of GDP in PPPs about 12 years 
later than China and began its period of rapid growth about 14 years later, it is not 
completely true that while China is becoming the “factory of the world”, India is 
becoming the “office of the world”. In India several industrial sectors such as 
machinery, chemicals, steel, pharmaceutics, three-wheel vehicles, motorcycles and, more 
recently, microelectronics hardware and automobiles, had a relevant and accelerated 
growth, although often inferior and delayed of some years with respect to the one 
registered in China. As we can see in Table 4, although in the period 1993-94/2006-7 a 
traditional sector (beverages, tobacco and related products) had the highest rate of 
growth in manufacturing industries, modern economy-of-scale sectors such as transport 
equipment and parts, machinery, non-metallic mineral products, chemicals, had strong 
and above-average dynamics.  
We take three examples: the steel, automobile and automotive components 
sectors in India. The giant Indian steel corporation Mittal has rapidly grown and has 
recently acquired the control of two of the leading European steel corporations. 
Moreover, the larger automotive sector in India has risen from 3.5 million vehicles in 
1995-6 (of which 2.2 million scooters and motorcycles, about 350 000 cars and 129 000 
buses and trucks) to 9.7 million vehicles in 2005-6 (of which 7.2 million scooters and 
motorcycles, about 1.1 millions cars and 219 000 buses and trucks) (Richet and Ruet, 
2008).  
After 1999, China’s production of passenger cars surpassed India’s production. 
However, although the major Indian car maker remains Maruti, which is controlled by a 
Japanese corporation (Suzuki), from the technological point of view there is probably 
no Chinese national car producer (distinguished from joint ventures with Japanese or 
Western firms) as strong as India’s Tata. This big corporation is developing its Nano 
project for small low-cost cars, has acquired Jaguar for luxury cars, has signed joint 
ventures with Fiat in India and in Latin America and all this will probably lead, after the 
world crisis, to a very fast growth in output both inland and abroad (Balcet and 
Bruschieri, 2008).  
Finally, the Indian corporation Bharat Forge, which makes components for cars 
and trucks, has rapidly grown in recent years and has invested massively abroad, also 
acquiring the control of a leading German firm (Balcet and Bruschieri, 2008).  
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Table 4. Output index for the manufacturing industry in India (base 1993-4 = 100; weights* industry = 100) 
  Industry group  Weight 1999-00 2004-05 2005-06  2006-07 P
1  Beverages, tobacco and related 
products  2.38 192.1  345.9  400.3  444.5 
2  Transport equipment and parts 3.98  194.1  283.7  319.7  367.7 
3  Machinery and equipment 
other than transport equipment 9.57 182.5  279.4  312.8  357.1 
4  Non-metallic mineral products 4.4  220.8  244.3  271.1  305.8 
5  Other manufacturing industries 2.56  142.5  221.2  276.9  298.4 
6  Textile products (including 
wearing apparel)  2.54  156.1  219.6  255.5   285.0 
7 
Basic chemicals and chemical 
products (except products of 
petroleum & coal) 
 14.0  164.6  238.6  258.5  283.4 
8  Basic metal and alloy industries 7.45  146.9  196.1  227  278.9 
9  Wool, silk and man- made fibre 
textiles  2.26 197.8  249 248.9  268.4 
10 
Paper and paper products and 
printing, publishing and allied 
industries 
2.65  180.5  230.7  228.6  248.6 
11 Rubber, plastic petroleum and 
coal products  5.73 137.2  192.2  200.5  226.3 
12 Food products  9.08  140.3  167.3  170.6  185.2 
13 
Metal products and parts 
(except machinery and 
equipment) 
2.81 137.8  166.3  164.4  183.2 
14 Cotton textiles  5.52  123.7  126.3  137  157.3 
15 Leather and leather& fur 
products  1.14 135.5  156.9  149.3  150.2 
16 Wood and wood products; 
furniture& fixtures  2.7  101.4  74.8  70.5  91 
17 Jute and other vegetable fibre 
textiles (except cotton)  0.59 105  107.2  107.7  90.7 
  Manufacturing (Total)  79.36  159.4  214.6  234.2  263.5 
P Provisional. Source: Central Statistical Organisation, Government of India. 
 
Although in India a large mass of the population remains very poor, and therefore 
unable to buy almost any durable consumption goods, the rapid growth in the last 15 
years made it possible for an increasing proportion of medium and high income people, 
mainly concentrated in urban areas, to have access to durable consumer goods, such as 
TV sets and other electric household appliances, scooters or three-wheel vehicles, and in 
the more affluent families, a PC and an automobile. From 1988-89 to 1998-9 the 
“higher income groups” (middle and upper middle class households, with an annual 
income over 75 000 Rupees in 1998-9 prices) almost doubled in percentage of total  
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households passing from 14% to 26% (Frankel, 2005, p. 596).
11 However in 1998-99, 
their share rose to 47% of urban households, but only to 17% of rural households. Of 
these “higher income groups”, about 150 million people lived in households with some 
purchasing power for durable consumer goods. 
In any case, even if the availability of these goods was limited to a minority, 
although gradually rising, share of the population, India had become the fifth or sixth 
world market for a substantial number of durable consumer goods and of services. The 
latter are partly imported, but mainly they are produced domestically with relative prices 
steadily declining thanks to economies of scale and/or network economies.  
5.  Factors Behind Productivity Growth: Sectoral Gains or Employment 
Reallocation? 
Both China and India have witnessed impressive rises in labour productivity. It is 
then worth understanding the factors behind the productivity growth. By using the 
methodology proposed by Syrquin (1986), we decompose the productivity growth of 
China and India into two parts, intrasectoral productivity gains and intersectoral 
employment-shift. The first one is the so called ‘productivity effect’, due to changes of 
productivity within each sector; the second one relies on the ‘reallocation effect’, 
depending on the movement of workers across sectors which differ in terms of 
productivity. At first we carry out this exercise for the main economic sectors and 
subsectors, with particular attention to services. Finally, since manufacturing growth was 
relevant in both countries, we focus on structural changes within this subsector.  






Where  L ξ  represents the economy-wide productivity growth; 
i
0 ϑ  and 
i
0 ε  the 
output share and the employment share of the sector i, respectively;  i X ˆ
 and  i L ˆ
 the 
output and the employment growth in the sector i. The first addend characterizes the 
component of economy-wide productivity growth which depends on the ‘productivity 
effect’, the second one the component related to the ‘reallocation effect’. A productivity 
effect with negative sign reveals that the employment growth rate is higher than the 
output one. Analogously, a reallocation effect lower than 0 can be caused by two 
factors: the employment growth rate is negative or the employment share is higher than 
the output share. In general, sectors presenting 
i
0 ϑ  greater than 
i
0 ε  are the most 
dynamic; the opposite is true for sectors with 
i
0 ϑ  lower than
i
0 ε . 
                                                 
11 The source of data is NCAER, Indian Market Demographics Report (2002). 
( ) ( ) [ ] ∑ − + − =
i
i
i i i i i
L L L X ˆ ˆ ˆ
0 0 0 ε ϑ ϑ ξ 
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6.  China 
The National Bureau of Statistics of China provides yearly data on GDP at 
constant prices and employment by sector and subsector; they are published on the 
China Statistical Yearbooks. GDP data were revised in accordance to the results of the 
first China Economic Census 2004. The composition of GDP is reported for the 
following subsectors: agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery and services in 
support of these activities; industry (mining and quarrying, manufacturing, production 
and supply of electricity, water and gas); construction; transport, storage and post; 
wholesale and retail trades; hotels and catering services; financial intermediation; real 
estate; other services. Unfortunately, the subsector classification for employment data 
differs from the classification used for the GDP composition.  
 
Table 5. Employed persons by sector and share in China, 1980=100 
  Total employed  
persons  Primary share Secondary share Tertiary share
1980  100.0  100.0  0.69 100.0  0.18 100.0  0.13 
1985  117.7  106.9  0.62  134.7  0.21  151.1  0.17 
1990  152.9  133.6  0.60 179.8  0.21 216.5  0.19 
1995  160.7  122.0  0.52  203.1  0.23  305.1  0.25 
2000  170.2  123.8  0.50 210.4  0.22 358.3  0.27 
2005  179.0  116.6  0.45  234.6  0.24  429.7  0.31 
2007  181.7  108.0  0.41 267.7  0.27 450.4  0.32 
Source: our calculations based on China Statistical Yearbook data (various years). 
 











trade, hotels and 
catering services 
 E  P  E  P  E  P  E  P 
1980 100  100  100  100  100  100 100  100 
1985  107  139  124  129  205  83  160  156 
1995 113  197  164  343  335  138 562  93 
2000  115  231  133  687  358  173 914  86 
2002 112  251  136  801  392  183 1092  86 
  Finance  Real estate  Other services TOTAL ECONOMY
 E  P  E  P  E  P  E  P 
1980 100  100  100  100  100  100 100  100 
1985  169  173  250  71  174  99  124  133 
1995 462  229  523  161  367  120 185  244 
2000  618  234  786  141  500  153 218  318 
2002 718  229  938  145  566  168 236  348 
Source: our calculations based on China Statistical Yearbook data (various years). 
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However, by merging the two sources of data, we obtain historical series for the 
following seven subsectors: agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery; industry 
(manufacturing, mining and utilities); construction; wholesale, retail trade, hotels and 
catering services; financial intermediation; real estate; other services (including 
community, social and personal services, transport, storage, post, telecommunication 
and others). 
 


















































































Source: China Statistical Yearbook (various years). “Agriculture” includes agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and 
fishery; “Industry” refers to manufacturing, mining and utilities. 
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Source: our calculations based on CSY data (various years). Sectors are encoded in the following way: 1_ Agriculture, 
forestry, animal husbandry and fishery; 2_ Industry (manufacturing, mining and utilities); 3_ Construction; 4_ Wholesale, 
retail trade, hotels and catering services; 5_ Financial intermediation; 6_ Real estate; 7_ Other services. 
 
Over the period 1980-2007, total employment grew by 81.7%. Although in 2007 
the number and the share of employed persons in the primary sector were still higher 
with respect to the other two sectors, the situation dramatically changed if compared to 
1980. In the first period, 1980-1992, the number of workers increased in all sectors 
(Figure 3).  
However, from 1992 to 2007 the number of agricultural workers fell and it was 
counterbalanced by a rise in employment both in the secondary and tertiary sectors; 
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(see Table 5). In particular, from 1995 the tertiary sector exceeded the secondary sector 
with respect to the absolute and relative level of employment. In other words, at the end 
of the period considered, China had characteristics similar to both a developed and a 
developing country: the largest part of labour force was employed in agricultural 
activities (over 41%), but the share of people working in services (32%) was greater than 
the share engaged in mining, manufacturing, construction and utilities (27%). In sum, an 
important reallocation of workers from the primary to the secondary and, above all, 
tertiary sectors occurred over the three decades. 
This reallocation can be better understood by observing the second panel of 
Figure 3, in which absolute and relative employment are depicted at the subsector level. 
Focusing on the tertiary sector, we can see that some subsectors particularly benefited 
from the movement of workers from agriculture: on the one hand wholesale, retail 
trade, hotels and catering services, where the number of employees increased ten-fold in 
the period 1980-2002; on the other hand, other services (including community, social 
and personal services, transport, storage, post, telecommunication and others), where 
employment increased by a factor of five. Although employment also grew in real estate 
and financial intermediation services, the share of workers in these subsectors remained 
low (Table 6). 
  If we look at the productivity gains, data show that until the beginning of the 
1990s they were modest in the whole economy and in each sector. However, starting 
from 1991, they began to increase; this increase was particularly evident in the secondary 
sector. In 2007, its productivity reached a level which was about 13 and 9 times that of 
the primary and the tertiary sectors, respectively (Figure 4). Focusing on the sub-sectoral 
level, we can not only see that four subsectors out of seven presented a relatively low 
level of productivity, but also that their productivity gains were modest: these subsectors 
are construction; wholesale, retail trade, hotels and catering services; other services 
(including community, social and personal services, transport, storage, post, 
telecommunication and others) and, as expected, agriculture. In 1980, just three 
subsectors were characterized by a relatively high level of productivity: financial 
intermediation and real estate, followed by industry. Even if productivity increased in all 
three subsectors, it is evident that in 2002 industrial productivity substantially exceeded 
all the others subsectors. The index of industrial productivity moved from 100 to 801 in 
the period 1980-2002 (Table 6). 
It is worth remarking that employment growth was very low in industry, while it 
was substantial in subsectors 4 (wholesale, retail trade, hotels and catering services) and 
7 (other services). It seems that the movement of workers didn’t follow productivity 
gains or, better, that in some subsectors the employment growth was faster than the 
output growth. Conversely, in manufacturing, mining and utilities employment didn’t 
notably grow, while output and, then, output per worker showed a dramatic rise.  
 The asymmetry between productivity increases and employment reallocation 
among sectors and subsectors is confirmed when we look at the decomposition of 
labour productivity growth (Table 7; for details, see Table A1, Statistical Appendix). It is 
evident that the economy-wide productivity gains were mainly due to the productivity 
increase within-sectors rather than to the movement of workers from low to high 
productivity sectors. This is particularly true in the period 1992-02, i.e. when 
productivity gains in industry became remarkable. In this period, indeed, they positively 
contributed to the economic growth (+108 percent), while the reallocation of workers 
counterbalanced this effect (-8 percent). In particular, the rise of productivity in industry  
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drove economic growth by contributing 90% of gains; on the contrary, the movement 
of workers from agriculture to sectors in which employment grew faster than output 
reduced the overall labour productivity growth; the whole contribution of the tertiary 
sector was just of 0.2 percent. We also decompose the growth of productivity within 
industry, which includes manufacturing, mining and utilities. In this case, the importance 
of the productivity effect is even stronger.
12 
 
Table 7: Decomposition of labour productivity growth in China– percentage contribution by 7 subsectors 
and industry 
 1980-92  1992-02  1980-02 
7 SUBSECTORS       
PRODUCTIVITY EFFECT  87.3  107.8  94.0 
REALLOCATION EFFECT  12.7  -7.8  6.0 
TOTAL EFFECT  100  100  100 
INDUSTRY     
PRODUCTIVITY EFFECT  87.3  98.6  98.3 
REALLOCATION EFFECT  12.7  1.4  1.7 
TOTAL EFFECT  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Calculations are based on 1980 constant prices. Industry included manufacturing, mining and utilities. 
Source: our calculations based on China Statistical Yearbook data (various years) and Szirmai et al. (2005).  
 
7.  India 
In order to investigate factors behind the Indian productivity growth, we use the 
data provided by the Gröningen Growth and Development Centre (GGDC). The 
GGDC data refer to nine different subsectors: agriculture, forestry, and fishing; mining 
and quarrying; manufacturing; public utilities; construction; wholesale and retail trade, 
hotels and restaurants; transport, storage and communication; finance, insurance and 
real estate; community, social, personal and government services. Also in India total 
employment grew from 1980 to 2004 (see Figure 5 and Table 8). However, in India not 
only the share of people employed in the primary sector remained high (62%), but the 
absolute number of agricultural workers increased (+39%). Although the rise of 
employment was higher in the secondary and tertiary sectors (131% and 114%, 
respectively), in 2004 the number of persons working in agricultural activities was about 
4 and 3 times the quantity of workers in the secondary and tertiary sectors.  
Moreover, we have to note that, unlike China, over the whole period (i.e. before 
and after the reforms) the absolute and relative employment in services was always 
higher than in the secondary sector. In Table 8, we also show the employment indexes 
for two sub-periods: 1980-92, before the trade policy reforms, and 1992-04, after these 
reforms. As we can see, employment increased over both periods, but its growth was 
                                                 
12 The National Bureau of Statistics of China does not provide reliable data disaggregated by branch of 
industry. Szirmai et al. revised official statistics and estimated the added value and the employment by 
branch of industry (Szirmai et al., 2005). Although these estimations are not representative for all the 
firms (just medium and large firms were considered) and employees (data are available just for staff and 
workers), they anyway are a useful source to delineate the productivity growth within industry.  
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faster before the reforms. Looking at subsector level (Figure 5), it is clear that, apart 
from agriculture, most workers were employed in manufacturing, wholesale, retail trade, 
hotels, restaurant and community, social and personal services. However, the highest 
employment growth rates concerned construction, real estate, insurance and financial 
intermediation. 
 





Primary share Secondary share Tertiary  share 
1980  100.0  100.0 0.72  100.0  0.11  100.0 0.17 
1985  112.5  108.8  0.70  120.4  0.12  123.3  0.18 
1990  128.0  118.3 0.67  147.0  0.13  158.0 0.21 
1995  144.3  128.3  0.64  192.4  0.15  182.0  0.21 
2000  162.8  139.2 0.62  251.8  0.17  206.8 0.21 
2004  161.6  139.0  0.62  231.0  0.16  214.4  0.22 
1980-92 
(1980=100) 
133.4  122.3   158.8    164.9  
1992-04 
(1992=100) 
121.2  113.7    145.5    130.0   
Source: our calculations based on GGDC data. 
 
Table 9. Employed persons (E) and productivity (P) by sector in India, 1980=100 
Source: our calculations based on GGDC data. 
 
Agriculture, 








  E P E P E P E P E P 
1980  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
1985  109  107  130  106  119  118  111  133  132  89 
1990  118 119 197 112 138 150 129 177 202 80 
1995  128  122  227  123  177  163  173  195  306  63 
2000  139 128 231 145 227 162 216 209 461 58 
2004  139  140  258  163  205  229  212  246  430  83 




















  E P E P E P E P E P 
1980  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
1985  136  98  120  116  116  157  117  113  112  114 
1990  186 97  145 135 147 227 145 127 128 136 
1995  217  110  179  138  311  183  157  151  144  153 
2000  249 133 219 177 615 136 161 227 163 180 
2004  274  171  210  294  796  138  155  298  162  232  
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In sum, it seems that in India the reallocation of workers was less clear, but 
anyway important: while in 2004 employment in the primary sector was still 
predominant, there was a movement of workers toward manufacturing on the one 
hand, and traditional services on the other hand; at the same time also modern services 
were witnessing a significant employment growth. Before the reforms, productivity was 
already increasing in all sectors (Figure 6).  
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Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing 
Source: GGDC. 
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However, after the economic reforms this increase accelerated, above all in the 
tertiary sector. Starting from 1996, services became the sector with the highest 
productivity level. Observing the picture in detail, we can see that the productivity 
growth was lower but better distributed among sectors with respect to the Chinese case. 
The subsectors gaining in terms of productivity growth were not only manufacturing, 
but also public utilities, transport, storage and communication, with community, social, 
personal and government services as leader sectors. Unlike in the Chinese case, in these 
sectors also employment grew but at a lower rate than output. On the contrary, finance, 
insurance and real estate showed unbalanced development. Before the reforms, these 
services had a growth in employment (84% in 1980-1992) lower than the productivity 
growth (122%).  
 
















































Source: our calculations based on GGDC data. Sectors are encoded in the following way: 1_ Agriculture, Forestry, and 
Fishing; 1_ Mining and Quarrying; 3_ Manufacturing; 4_ Public Utilities; 5_ Construction; 6_ Wholesale and Retail 
Trade, Hotels and Restaurants; 7_ Transport, Storage, and Communication; 8_ Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate; 9_ 
Community, Social, Personal and Government Services.  
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However, after the reforms this trend reversed: in 2004 these subsectors 
presented the highest employment growth (696% with respect to 1980) but a decreasing 
labour productivity (Table 9).  
The more balanced pattern of growth with respect to the Chinese one is 
demonstrated by decomposing labour productivity growth. The contributions by each 
sector and subsector, indeed, are less divergent, although some sectors led the process 
more than others: manufacturing and overall services. Even if the highest contribution 
was given by the increase in productivity within-sectors (68% in the period after the 
reforms), it was accompanied by a balanced reallocation of workers towards sectors with 
high productivity (32% in the same period). 
 
Table 10. Decomposition of labour productivity growth in India – percentage contribution by 9 sectors 
 1980-92  1992-04  1980-04 
PRODUCTIVITY EFFECT  64.8  68.2  75.8 
REALLOCATION EFFECT  35.2  31.8  24.2 
TOTAL EFFECT  100  100  100 
Calculations based on 1993-94 constant prices. Source: our calculations based on GGDC data. 
 
It must be underlined that this analysis is based on reallocation flows by industry 
but it doesn’t consider the institutional framework regarding the labour market. Indeed, 
when also the distinction between formal and informal sectors is taken into account, the 
contribution of labour reallocation in terms of productivity growth is reduced. The 
movement of workers from agriculture to other sectors increased labour productivity; 
however, this effect was partially counterbalanced by the movement of workers from 
formal to informal sectors, where not only productivity but also wages are very low and 
illiteracy is substantial (OECD, 2007; Dougherty at al., 2009). 
8.  Conclusions 
As mentioned in the introduction, the rise in industrial activities was anticipated in 
time, becoming more intense and wider in scope in China than in India, where industry 
is nevertheless gaining momentum. The fordist model of growth operated in China 
earlier and much more intensively than in India. There are very important differences in 
the pattern of growth of the two countries, some of which closely associated to the 
different timing and amplitude of structural changes. 
Not only has China a much larger industrial sector than India, even discounting 
the fact that its rapid industrialization process began some 12-15 years earlier than in 
India, but also its industrial activities are much less fragmented. India has an 
extraordinarily large number of micro-enterprises and a very vast “informal economy”, 
much larger than China’s. Moreover, India has a very large chain of production 
intermediaries and of wholesale and retail traders. These long production and 
distributive chains may sustain employment and reduce labour costs, but decrease 
productivity and tend to greatly increase the spread between prices earned by producers 
and consumer prices.  
In India the software sector is more advanced than in China, although an 
important part of the sector is carried out as sub-contractor of foreign companies, while 
the production of hardware in India is much weaker than in China. China has  
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experienced a much larger structural transformation than India, partly due to a deeper 
integration in the world economy. 
Some of the differences in the productive structure are associated with the 
differences in education in the two countries. India has a more bi-polar system. It has, in 
fact, a large mass of people illiterate or with a weak command of the more diffused 
national languages and no knowledge of foreign languages as English, and at the same 
time, a consistent and rapidly growing number of engineers, microelectronics experts 
and other University graduates with a good knowledge of English. China has a less 
differentiated education system, with, on the average, a more educated work-force, but 
with increasing inequalities in the access to higher education and high quality schools.
13  
Owing to its earlier economic period of rapid growth and to its more centralized 
decision–making process, China has created, in its more economically dynamic zones, 
better transport and communication infrastructure than India. Lower transport and 
trading costs and larger scale economies in some sectors have contributed to increase 
the international competitiveness of China if compared with India. 
 While the Indian banking and financial market appears to be more advanced and 
sophisticated than the Chinese market, the latter has grown more rapidly and has greatly 
benefited from the return under the control of China of the great and sophisticated 
financial market of Hong Kong.
14 
Finally, since 1978, pollution and income and wealth inequalities among families 
and among regions have increased both in China and in India, but much more markedly 
in China. Although the extent of poverty has diminished in both countries, it remains 
very large in India and sizeable in various parts of China.  
References 
Amighini A. (2005), ‘China in the International Fragmentation of Production: Evidence from 
the ICT Industry’, European Journal of Comparative Economics”, 2 
Balcet G. Bruschieri S. (2008), ‘Technology transfer, Joint Ventures and the Emergence of 
Indian Multinationals: the Case of the Automotive Industry’, Asia and Europe: Connections and 
Contrasts, Anderosso-O'Callaghan B., Zolin M.B. (eds), Libreria Editrice Cafoscarina, Venezia 
Basu K. (2007) (ed.) The Oxford Companion to economics in India, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Bossworth B., Collins S.M. (2008), ‘Accounting for Growth: Comparing China and India’, The 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 22(1), 45-65. 
Chenery H.B. et al. (1979), Structural change and development policy, New York Oxford University 
Press 
                                                 
13 See, for the Chinese case, Saccone (2008). 
14 For an analysis of the Chinese financial market see, for example, Sau (2008) and (2009), Chiarlone, Ferri 
(2007).  




Available online at http://eaces.liuc.it 
124 
Chenery H.B., Robinson S., Syrquin M. (1986), Industrialization and growth: a comparative study, New 
York, Oxford University Press  
Chiarlone S. , Ferri G. (2007), ‘Problemi e prospettive del sistema bancario cinese’, I sistemi 
bancari dei paesi emergenti, Chiarlone S., Ferri G., pp. 61-98, Bancaria editrice, Roma 
Chiarlone S., Amighini A. (2007), L’economia della Cina, Carocci, Roma 
Dougherty S., Herd R., Chalaux T. (2009), ‘What is Holding Back Productivity Growth in India? 
Recent Microevidence’, OECD Journal: Economic Studies, 2009 
Frankel F.R. (2005), Indian’s Political economy: 1947-2004, Oxford, Oxford University Press 
Fuà G. (1980), Problemi dello sviluppo tardivo in Europa, Il Mulino, Bologna 
Galbraith J.K., Krytynskaia L. (2004), Wang Q., ‘The Experience of Rising Inequality in Russia 
and China during the Transition’, European Journal of Comparative Economics, 1 
Gerschenkron A. (1962), Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, Mass 
GGDC (2009), Total Data Base, Groningen Growth and Development Center, available at: 
http://www.eco.rug.nl/ggdc 
Herd S., Dougherty R. (2007), ‘Growth Prospects in China and India Compared’, European 
Journal of Comparative Economics, June 2007 
IMF (2006), ‘Asia rising: patterns of economic development and growth’, World Economic 
Outlook, Washington D.C. 
Kuznets S. (1966), Modern Economic Growth: Rate, Structure, and Spread, Yale University Press, New 
Haven, London 
Maddison A. (2007), Contours of the World Economy. 1-2030 AD, Oxford University Press, Oxford 
Maddison A. (2007), Chinese Economic Performance in the Long Run, 2nd edition, OECD, Paris  
Maddison A., Wu H.X. (2008), ‘Measuring China’s Economic Performance’, World Economics, 
9(2), April-June 
Malle S. (2006), ‘Profili macro-economici della Cina’, Il Politico , Settembre-Dicembre, 194-216 
National Bureau of Statistics of China (2008), China Statistics Yearbook  
National Bureau of Statistics of China (2009), http://www.stats.gov. cn/english/  
OECD (2005), OECD Economic Surveys: China, Paris. 
OECD (2007) OECD Economic Surveys: India, Paris. 
Pasinetti L. (1981), Structural Change and Economic Growth, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge  
Structural Change and Economic Development in China and India  
 
Available online at http://eaces.liuc.it 
125
Richet X, Ruet J. (2008), The Chinese and Indian Automobile Industry in Perspective: Technology 
Appropriation, Catching-up and Development, forthcoming 
Saccone D. (2008) ‘Educational Inequality and Educational Poverty: the Chinese Case in the 
Period 1975-2004’, Working papers, 8, Department of Economics, University of Turin 
Sau L. (2008), ‘La struttura del sistema finanziario in Cina’, Working papers, 7, Department of 
Economics, University of Turin 
Sau L. (2009), ‘Gradualism and the Evolution of the Financial Structure in China’, Working 
papers, 3, Department of Economics, University of Turin 
Syrquin M. (1986), ‘Productivity growth and factor reallocation’, Industrialization and growth, in H. 
B. Chenery (Ed.), Oxford University Press, Oxford 
Szirmai A., Ren R., Bai M. (2005), ‘Chinese Manufacturing Performance in Comparative 
Perspective, 1980-2002’, Center Discussion Paper,  920, Economic Growth Center, Yale 
University. 
UNDP (2008), Human Development Report, Oxford University Press, Oxford 
Valli V. (2002), L’Europa e l’economia mondiale, Carocci, Roma  
Valli V. (2005), Politica economica. Introduzione all’economia dello sviluppo, Carocci, Roma 
Valli V. (2009). ‘The Three Waves of the Fordist Model of Growth and the Case of China’, 
Working papers, 5, Department of Economics, University of Turin 
World Bank (2009), World Development Indicators, Washington D.C.  




Available online at http://eaces.liuc.it 
126 
Statistical Appendix 
Table A1. Decomposition of labour productivity growth in China– percentage contribution by 7 subsectors 
 1980-92 1992-02  1980-02
Agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery      
productivity effect  16.0  7.8  8.7 
reallocation effect  -4.5  1.4  -0.7 
TOTAL EFFECT  11.5  9.2  8.1 
Industry (manufacturing, mining and utilities)       
productivity  effect  59.1 90.4 71.9 
reallocation effect  10.7  -3.0  1.8 
TOTAL  EFFECT  69.8 87.4 73.7 
Construction     
productivity  effect  1.2 3.0 2.4 
reallocation effect  2.5  0.3  1.1 
TOTAL  EFFECT  3.7 3.3 3.5 
Wholesale, retail trade, hotels and catering services      
productivity effect  1.7  -4.2  -1.4 
reallocation effect  1.6  -4.1  1.6 
TOTAL EFFECT  3.3  -8.3  0.2 
Financial  intermediation     
productivity effect  5.7  -1.0  2.6 
reallocation effect  1.8  3.8  1.3 
TOTAL  EFFECT  7.5 2.8 3.9 
Real  estate       
productivity effect  3.1  -0.5  1.5 
reallocation effect  3.2  3.3  2.3 
TOTAL  EFFECT  6.4 2.8 3.8 
Other  services     
productivity effect  0.4  12.4  8.3 
reallocation effect  -2.5  -9.5  -1.4 
TOTAL EFFECT  -2.1  2.9  6.9 
TOTAL ECONOMY        
productivity effect  87.3  107.8  94.0 
reallocation effect  12.7  -7.8  6.0 
TOTAL  EFFECT  100 100 100 
Calculations are based on 1980 constant prices.  
Source: our calculations based on China Statistical Yearbook data (various years).  
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Table A2. Decomposition of labour productivity growth in Chinese industry– percentage contribution by 
branch 
 1980-92  1992-02  1980-02 
Food manufacturing        
productivity effect  5.1  5.6  5.5 
reallocation effect  -0.2  0.0  0.0 
TOTAL EFFECT  4.9  5.6  5.5 
Beverage manufacturing        
productivity effect  2.7  2.0  2.2 
reallocation effect  0.7  -0.1  0.1 
TOTAL EFFECT  3.5  2.0  2.2 
Tobacco processing        
productivity effect  4.4  4.0  4.1 
reallocation effect  5.8  -0.5  0.5 
TOTAL EFFECT  10.2  3.5  4.6 
Textile industry        
productivity effect  -5.5  6.8  5.6 
reallocation effect  3.4  0.8  0.0 
TOTAL EFFECT  -2.0  7.5  5.6 
Clothing industry        
productivity effect  2.9  2.3  2.5 
reallocation effect  -1.3  0.0  -0.2 
TOTAL EFFECT  1.6  2.3  2.3 
Leather and fur products        
productivity effect  0.3  1.3  1.2 
reallocation effect  -0.5  0.0  -0.1 
TOTAL EFFECT  -0.3  1.3  1.1 
Wood products        
productivity effect  -0.4  0.6  0.5 
reallocation effect  -0.4  0.1  0.0 
TOTAL EFFECT  -0.8  0.8  0.5 
Paper and printing products        
productivity effect  1.2  2.5  2.3 
reallocation effect  -0.6  0.2  0.0 
TOTAL EFFECT  0.6  2.7  2.3 
Oil refining, coking and coal products        
productivity effect  -6.1  -0.1  -0.8 
reallocation effect  7.8  -0.2  0.7 
TOTAL EFFECT  1.7  -0.3  0.0 
Chemical industry, excl. oil        
productivity effect  14.6  11.9  12.2 
reallocation effect  2.0  -0.5  0.1 
TOTAL EFFECT  16.6  11.4  12.4 
Rubber and plastics        
productivity effect  1.6  2.9  2.7 
reallocation effect  0.5  0.0  0.0 
TOTAL EFFECT  2.1  2.9  2.8 
Non-metallic minerals        
productivity effect  6.0  2.9  3.2 
reallocation effect  -3.1  0.6  -0.1 
TOTAL EFFECT  2.9  3.5  3.1  




Available online at http://eaces.liuc.it 
128 
Basic metals        
productivity effect  4.5  5.0  5.0 
reallocation effect  1.4  -0.1  0.1 
TOTAL EFFECT  5.8  4.9  5.1 
Fabricated metals        
productivity effect  0.7  2.1  2.0 
reallocation effect  -0.8  0.4  0.1 
TOTAL EFFECT  0.0  2.5  2.0 
Machinery        
productivity effect  15.3  9.5  9.6 
reallocation effect  -2.1  0.6  0.4 
TOTAL EFFECT  13.2  10.0  10.0 
Transport equipment        
productivity effect  10.9  11.2  11.5 
reallocation effect  -0.9  0.0  -0.1 
TOTAL EFFECT  10.0  11.2  11.4 
Electrical machinery and equipment        
productivity effect  4.4  5.2  5.2 
reallocation effect  -0.5  0.0  0.0 
TOTAL EFFECT  3.9  5.3  5.1 
Electronic and telecom equipment        
productivity effect  4.7  9.0  8.9 
reallocation effect  -0.6  0.0  -0.1 
TOTAL EFFECT  4.1  9.0  8.7 
Instruments        
productivity effect  0.7  0.8  0.8 
reallocation effect  -0.1  0.0  0.0 
TOTAL EFFECT  0.6  0.8  0.8 
Furniture        
productivity effect  0.1  0.4  0.4 
reallocation effect  0.0  0.1  0.1 
TOTAL EFFECT  0.1  0.5  0.4 
Other manufacturing        
productivity effect  1.8  2.1  2.1 
reallocation effect  -0.9  0.1  -0.1 
TOTAL EFFECT  0.9  2.2  2.0 
Mining and Utilities       
productivity effect  17.4  10.3  11.5 
reallocation effect  3.1  -0.1  0.4 
TOTAL EFFECT  20.6  10.1  11.9 
TOTAL INDUSTRY        
productivity effect  87.3  98.6  98.3 
reallocation effect  12.7  1.4  1.7 
TOTAL EFFECT  100  100  100 
Calculations are based on 1980 constant prices. Source: our calculations based on Szirmai et al. (2005).  
Structural Change and Economic Development in China and India  
 
Available online at http://eaces.liuc.it 
129
Table A3. Decomposition of labour productivity growth in India – percentage contribution by 9 subsectors 
 1980-92  1992-04  1980-04 
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing       
productivity effect  18.6  8.0  10.8 
reallocation effect  -13.3  -5.7  -5.7 
TOTAL EFFECT  5.3  2.3  5.1 
Mining and Quarrying       
productivity effect  1.1  1.9  1.6 
reallocation effect  3.6  0.6  1.3 
TOTAL EFFECT  4.7  2.5  2.9 
Manufacturing      
productivity effect  16.8  17.2  17.8 
reallocation effect  4.9  2.9  2.6 
TOTAL EFFECT  21.7  20.2  20.4 
Public Utilities       
productivity effect  4.2  1.3  2.4 
reallocation effect  1.1  1.3  0.7 
TOTAL EFFECT  5.3  2.6  3.2 
Construction      
productivity effect  -7.4  1.8  -2.0 
reallocation effect  12.6  3.6  7.5 
TOTAL EFFECT  5.2  5.4  5.5 
Wholesale and Retail Trade, Hotels 
and Restaurants 
    
productivity effect  0.1  17.5  12.4 
reallocation effect  15.4  3.5  6.9 
TOTAL EFFECT  15.5  21.0  19.3 
Transport, Storage, and 
Communication 
    
productivity effect  7.7  14.1  12.4 
reallocation effect  4.4  2.0  2.1 
TOTAL EFFECT  12.1  16.1  14.5 
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate        
productivity effect  12.3  -12.7  4.0 
reallocation effect  4.0  23.4  8.0 
TOTAL EFFECT  16.3  10.7  12.0 
Community, Social, Personal and 
Government Services 
    
productivity effect  11.4  19.0  16.3 
reallocation effect  2.5  0.1  0.7 
TOTAL EFFECT  13.9  19.1  17.0 
TOTAL ECONOMY        
productivity effect  64.8  68.2  75.8 
reallocation effect  35.2  31.8  24.2 
TOTAL EFFECT  100  100  100 
Calculations are based on 1993-94 constant prices. Source: our calculations based on GGDC data. 
 